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Sovereign  Debt:  Is to Forgive  to Forget? 
ABSTRACT 
International  lending to a less-developed  country  cannot be 
based on the debtor's reputation  for making repayments.  That  is, 
loans  to LDCs  will  not  be made or repaid unless  foreign creditors 
have legal  or other  direct sanctions  they  can exercise against a 
sovereign  debtor  who  defaults.  Even if some  lending is feasible 
because of direct  sanctions,  having a reputation  for repayment in 
no way enhances  a small  LDC's  ability to borrow. 
Jeremy  Bulow  Kenneth Rogoff 
Graduate  School of  Business  Economics Department 
Stanford University  University  of  Wisconsin 
Stanford,  CA  94305  Madison, WI  53706-1393 
(415) 723-2160  (608) 263-3876 I. INTRODUCTION 
The period from 1973  to 1982  saw  a startling increase in the 
volume of international  loans  to less-developed  countries.  A 
central issue  in analyzing  LDC  loan contracts is whether,  and by 
what  mechanism, these  contracts  can be enforced.)  Whereas 
domestic  loans  are generally  supported  by substantial  collateral, 
the assets that  can  be appropriated  in the  event  of a foreign 
sovereign's  default are generally  negligible.2  For  this  reason 
one must look beyond collateral to find  incentives for  repayment. 
One  approach,  first  explored  by Eaton  and Cersovitz (1981) 
and adopted by many  others  since3,  assumes that  creditors  have 
legal  rights  whatsoever (including  even  the right to seize  the 
county's  assets  abroad).  This  line of research holds  that a 
small  LDC  is able  to borrow abroad  only  if it can maintain a 
reputation  for repaying its loans.  Lenders are willing to rely 
on a country's "reputation  for repayment" (so the argument  goes> 
because they believe that  if a  country  ever  fails  to honor  its 
implicit debt  contract,  it will  tarnish  its reputation and  risk 
being cut  off from international  capital  markets in the future. 
Theories that  ignore  contract enforcement problems 
suggest  that  there  should  be  far greater integration  of world 
capital  markets than  currently  occurs.  For  a survey of the 
empirical  evidence on international  capital mobility, see 
Obstfeld (1986). 
2 
Though Iran  in 1979  was  an exception. 
Other  examples include Manuelli (1986),  Eaton,  Gersovitz 
and Stiglitz (1986), Grossman and Van Huyck (1987),  and  Cole  and 
English (1987).  Eaton and Gersovitz  also  considered direct 
punishments. 2 
The  obvious  appeal of pure reputation  theories  is that  they  seem 
robust  to institutional  detail.  One  does  not  have  to speoulate 
on the legal  rights of creditors  within their  own oountries' 
oourts,  or on the ability  of oreditors  to induoe  their 
governments  to take  retaliatory  motions. 
But we have  oome  to query reputation-for-repayment  theories, 
not to praise  them.  We prove,  under  rather  general oonditions, 
that  reputation-for-repayment  models  oannot  work.  Loans  to LDCs 
are possible only if creditors  have legal  rights  suoh  as the 
ability to impede  a county's  trade,  or to seize  its finmnoial 
assets abroad (whirh  is the  real reason  why  a defaulter suffers 
reduced  access  to capital  markets).4  Otherwise,  creditors  must 
be able  to threaten the debtors interests  outside its borrowing 
relationships.  (E.g.,  creditors  may be able  to persuade their 
governments  to intervene  militarily.)  Having a good  reputation 
for  repaying  foreign loans does  not  in any  way enhance the 
ability of  a smsll LDC  to borrow  abroad. 
For  a discussion of the legal  evidence on this  point,  and 
an assessment  of its probable empirical  significance,  see  Bulow 
and Rogoff (1987),  or Alexander (1987). 3 
II.  TR  NODEL 
Our paradigm is of  a small country that  faces  competitive, 
risk-neutral  foreign investors.5  The country is small in the 
sense  that  it cannot  affect the world interest rate  r. 
The country is inhabited  by  a single,  infinitely-lived 
representative  agent.  Since  the proof of our  theorem is based on 
an arbitrage  argument,  it is not necessary to place any 
restrictions  on the  agent's  utility function other  than  that  she 
prefers having  more  to having less. 
There is one  good,  which the  country  both produces and 
consumes.  The country's  production  function is given by 
(1) 
where  y denotes  output,  and  t  subscripts  denote  time. 
it  );  the  's 
are exogenous, serially- 
independent  disturbance  terms.  1tl  1t-l'  't-2'  1t-3' 
where  is investment  in period t.  Net exports in period t, 
are given by 
—  — 
Ct,  (2) 
c,  I  0;  y  > 0;  X 
—  where  c is the country's 
consumption  and Y is the output  of  the rest  of the world. 
The  sequence  of events  within any  given  period t  is as 
follows:  First,  a shock  occurs  which  affecta output in the 
It  is  straightforward  to extend  our analysis to the  case 
of risk-averse foreign lenders. 4 
current period and possibly in future periods.  After observing 
the  shock,  the country decides  how  to divide y  between I_,  c, 
and X.  Net exports can be used  either to make  payments on 
various  loans,  or to increase asset holdings abroad,  and 
can be observed  by everyone;  there is no privatt inforaation 
about  aggregate  variables.6 
It is not necessary  here  to  formally  characterize the 
benefits a small  country  aight  get  from having access  to world 
capital  aarksts.  Fundamentslly,  however,  the main benefits all 
have  to do with  consumption  smoothing.7  Through short-term 
borrowing and  lending,  a country  cen avoid having to match the 
exact timing  of import  expenditures  and export receipts.  Having 
access  to long-term  loans  allows  a country to maintain 
consumption  levels  in the short-term  while taking advantage  of 
high-yielding  domestic investment  opportunities.  Finally,  by 
taking advantage of world capital markets, a country can better 
insure  itself  against many  types of risk (such  as untertainty 
over  its terms  of trade) 
The world market value of a  .aim to the country's  entire 
future  gross  income  is  given by 
W(i  1t-l 
— EEy/(l 
+ r)5t.  (3) 
We assume  that 
W0 
< ,  which  implies that  for any finite t, 
6  We will  discuss  the case  of private information  later  on. 
See Eaton and Gersovitz  (1981),  and Eaton,  Gersovitz  and 
Stiglitz (1986) S 
with  probability  one.8  The force of  this assumption  is to 
rule  out  any  "Ponzi"-type  reputational  contracts, under which a 
borrower can  always  expect,  in present value  terms,  to be  a net 
importer of capital  over  some  finite  horizon. 
The assumption that P is finite  is slightly stronger  than 
the assumption that  the market value  of the  country's  net  income 
(net  of investment)  is finite.  However,  the assumption that 
P0  is finite  can  easily  be replaced  by the assumption that  the 
market value  of the world's net  income  is finite.  All  our 
results go through  under this  alternative  assumption,  with  only 
very minor changes  in the  proofs. 6 
III.  TYPES  OF LENDING CONTRACTS 
In a pure  reputation-for-repayment  ("reputation")  contract 
a country's  foreign creditors  have  no effective legal  recoucse in 
the  event  of default,  They  cannot  interfere  with the country's 
trade;  they  cannot  even seize any  financia1  assets  it may hold 
abroad.  The worst fate  that can befall a country  which defaults 
on  a reputation  contract is  that  it will  never again  be allowed 
to write reputation  contracts.  However,  the defaulting country 
cannot  be cut  off  from  international  capital markets entirely 
Though it may  no longer  be able  to borrow for  domestic 
Investment,  it can  still  buy consumption-insurance  contracts by 
paying cash in advance.  A "cash-in-advance"  contract is just  a 
conventional  insurance  contract  under which a country  makes  a 
payment up  front  in return for a state-contingent,  non-negative 
future  payment.  Implicitly,  we are aasuming that  there  are 
foreign investors  who can make commitments.  These  commitments 
are enforced  by the  legal  system  in investors'  countries.  Thus  a 
small  country can hold foreign  assets such  as bank accounts, 
treasury bills,  stocks  and  other  state-contingent  aaaeta.9  Of 
course,  it can  also  stockpile  reserves of precious metals and 
foreign currency. 
A.  Reoutation Contracts 
Suppose the country  were allowed to have a reputation 
Notable efforts  to study  international  lending in  a 
general equilibrium framework  include  Manuelli (1986) and Cole 
and English (1987) contract which,  in essence,  is  an implicit contract.  For  our 
purposes, it is not necessary to ask what  set of off-the- 
equilibrium-path  beliefs  might  support  the  contract,  nor  is it 
important  to ask whether the contract is optimal in any aense)0 
All  one needs to know is that  any reputation contract  must 
implicitly  specify a  state-contingent  payment  for 
all possible realizations  of  and 'tl' and  for  all  t,  where 
— 
Note  that  for  an implicit  contract to be equilibrium,  it 
must  be  in the country's  interest to honor the contract in every 
possible state  of nature.  In particular,  the country must  never 
have  an  Incentive  to default  on  Its reputation  contract and 
switch completely  over  to cash-in-advance  contracts.  (Otherwise, 
the contract is not  the  true  implicit  contract.) 
Given the  implicit  contract,  one can write  the world market 
value of the country's  reputation  debt  at time  t, D, as the 
expected present-discounted  value of its  future  repayments: 
For  example,  the candidate  equilibrium  can involve 
trigger-strategies  as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Eaton, 
Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986),  and Grossman and Van  Huyck  (l987'. 
Alternatively, the equilibrium  can involve  lenders  having 
imperfect information  about  the country's  utility function 
(provided they know that  it has  a positive marginal utility of 
consumption) 
11  This  specification  does  not preclude randomized 
strategies.  One  can  view  8,  as a vector,  one  of whose  elements 
has  no effect on fundamentls  such  as output.  If the foreign 
investor can make  legal  commitments,  then  the implicit contract 
and  the explicit legal contract will  coincide whenever P ￿  0.  In 
states  of nature  where  P  0,  any explicit legal contract  is 
meaningless,  by assumption. B 
N  s—t) 
7c-l  Et I 
E  P/(l + r) 
j.  (4) 
s—t  J 
Clearly,  Dt 
can  never  exceed W, the world market value of a 
claim to the country's  entire future  output stream.  Thus  within 
any reputational  equilibrium  there must exist  some 
o ￿  k' ￿  1,  such that with  probability  one Vt, 
1t-l  k'W(i 1t-l' 
V ° 't-l  (5) 
Let  k be  the amallest  k'  such  that  condition (5)  holds. 
B.  Cash-in Advance Contracts 
In a cash-in-advance  contract,  the country  pays the amount 
At at the  end  of period t  in exchange for a contract which pays 
0t+19t+I' 
in period t  + 1.  (A cash-in-advance  contract can 
always  be indexed to all  the  same variables as the implicit 
-  12  -  -  reputation contract.  )  Even  if the  country  has forfeited its 
reputation for honoring contracts,  a foreign investor  should 
always  be willing to accept a cash-in-advance  contract as long  as 
it satisfies  two  requirements13: 
E{C+i(et+1 1) 
—  (1  +  r)A1  (6) 
12  We shall  discuss  the  issue  of indexstion  in more detail 
later in section  V. 
13  -  -  -  Here  we are only defining one-period  cash-in-advance 
contracts.  In principle, the country  could make s payment in t—1 
in exchange for  (strictly  positive)  state-contingent  payments in 
t, t+l,  t+2,  etc.  It can be shown,  however,  that  multi-period 
cash-in-advance  contracts  are  superfluous. 9 
G+i(Ot+i )  (7) 
Condition  (6)  states that  the contract must offer  the  risk- 
neutral  foreign investor the market rate  of return.  Condition (7) 
says  that  there can be no state  of nature in which the country is 
called upon to make positive payments in period t  + 1. 
Obvious1y  one must also have At  0, but this condition holds 
whenever (6) and (7)  hold.  If one  thinks  of the  initial  payment 
A  as being collateral,  then  condition (7)  can be interpreted  as 
saying  that  the country's  collateral  must be sufficient to cover 
its losses on the contract even  in the worat possible state of 
nature. 10 
IV.  NON-EXISTENCE OF SUPPORTABLE  REPUTATION CONTRACTS. 
A.  Z.  utation contracts in the abseig of direct  unishments 
We are flow ready to state  the central theorem of this paper: 
flsg_rem_1:  In any sequential  aquilibrfua,  D  S 0  Vt. 
Proof:  Suppose 0  ￿  k(W  — y).  Then the country can  cease 
payrent on its reputation  contract and initiate the following 
sequence  of cash-in-advance  contracts: 
For  all  t ￿  a,  invest At in return  for  a payment of 0t14  in 
the ensuing period  where: 
A (7  7  )  P  (7 ,  I  + k(W  — y  ) 
—  0  ,  (8)  as  a-I  a  a  s-l  s  s  a 
A(e0 t-l  1t-l 
+  1t-i 
— ky0,  Vt>  a, (9) 
I)  kW0(i 1tl 
— DC,  1tl 
,  Vt > a.  (10) 
Since D  S kW,,  inspection  of  (10) indicates that  condition 
(7)  is satisfied.  We note  from  (3)  that 
E0(W+1)  (1 + r)(W0 —  (II) 
and  from  (4)  that 
E(Di) 
— (I  ÷ r)(D 
— 
P0).  (12) 
Straightforward  substitution  of  (11) and  (12)  into  (8),  (9)  and 
(10) yields  immediate  confirmation  of  (6).  Thus,  the  sequence  of 
cash-in-advance  contracts  is feasible.  Furthermore,  note  that 
instead  of paying P 
each  period,  the country must contribute 11 
only  A  ￿  in period s and  — ky ￿  for t > s,  with 
equality  holding only  when  k — 0.  Thus k must equal  zero and by 
(5), D  ￿  0 Vt.  Q.E.D. 
Thus  if one  traces  out  the game  tree governed by any 
reputation  contract, there  must  exist some node at which  the 
country can switch to a sequence  of cash-in-advance  contracts 
which dominates the reputation  contract.  The  collateral  for the 
cash-in-advance  contracts is drawn  from  funds  the country  would 
otherwise  have  used  to pay back its reputation contract.  Despite 
the fact  that  the collateral  may at first  be quite small,  it is 
still  sufficient to provide at least as much insurance  as the 
country could have  obtained under  the reputation contract.  A 
reputation  contract can  only  be equilibrium  under the unrealistic 
assumption  that  the country is not allowed to hold assets  abroad, 
B,  Reputation contracts  when  lenders  have direct means fpt 
punishins  default 
In the preceding analysis,  we assumed that  holders of 
reputation  contracts  have  no way  to directly punish the country 
if it repudiates.  Here  we show  that  if there  are  some  direct 
costs  which lenders can impose  on a country in the event of 
default,  then  loans  can  sustained,  but only on  the basis  of  these 
costs.  A good reputation for repaying loans  will  not  in any way 
enhance  a country's  ability to borrow. 
Suppose that  lenders  have the ability to  impose  a random 
penalty of  tl' q) 
if a borrower stands  in default in 12 
period t,  where  is independent of  6  and y 
>  ￿  0.  The 
penalty causes the country's  period-t ourput ro be  reduced  by 
ire. 
Then  we can generalize Theorem I as follows: 
flgrem_2:  In any sequential  equilibrium; 
Dt 
S E  tr! 
r)Kt, 
Proof  Seo Appendix. 
Actually,  the bound given by Theorem 2 may  be too high, 
since  countries can typically  bargain with their  creditors.14 
14 
See Bulow and Rogoff (1987) for  a bargaining-rheoretic 
interpretation  of  rescheduling  agreements. 13 
V.  LIMITATIONS  AND EXTENSIONS 
Here  we emphasize  some  limitations  on the  scope  of our 
result. 
A.  Reputation Outside the  Scooe  of the Lendins Relationship 
What  if repudiation  damages  a country's  general image beyond 
just  its reputation for repaying its loans?  One  might,  for 
example,  envision some  countries  as playing a tariff supergame, 
in which either raising tariffs  or defaulting  on foreign debt 
triggers a costly  trade  war.  Such  a mechanism could  conceivably 
15 
support a poslttve level  of lending.  However,  Theorem 2 
directly applies to this  case.  The maximum amount the country is 
allowed to borrow must  be governed strictly  by the costs of a 
trade  war.  If the costs  of a trade  war  are very small,  then  the 
amount the  country  can borrow is very small,  We do not claim 
that  reputation  piays no role  in international  relations,  only 
that  a good  reputation  for repayina foreizn loans  does  not 
enhance a  small country's ability to borrow abroad. 
B.  Non-Competitive  Lenders 
Theorems 1 and 2 are based on the standard assumption that 
the country faces  competitive  foreign investors.  In some  sense, 
the essence of our  result  is that  if there  are no gains for  the 
country in dealing  with any  specific  lender,  then reputation 
contracts  are  impossible.  As long  as the country faces 
15  Some  of the broader incentives  for repayment  are 
discussed  by Feldstein,  Decarmay,  Narusawa and Krugiuan (1987,  p. 
41). 14 
competitive foreign investors,  then any service provided by the 
current lender (e.g.,  insurance)  can equally well  be provided by 
a new investor.  It is possible,  of course,  that  in practice 
there may be some  efficiency gain  in having the country continue 
to deal  with its current lenders,  However, the  upper  bound on 
any  "reputation'  debt is  still  only  the  real  cost to the countty 
of switching its business to  a new  set  of financial  institutions. 
It seems  that  this  cost  cannot  be very large  relative to the  size 
of most  LDG's  foreign debts. 
C.  3jflgjli,jrQflemgjacfln 
We have assumed that  the country can hold assets  abroad 
which are indexed to the  same  observable  exogenous shocks,  D, as 
in a reputation  contract.  An alternative assumption is that S  is 
"observable  but not verifiable."16  That  is,  the borrower, the 
lender, a  all  potential lenders  observe 8.  However,  either 
because it is costly to verify 8  in  court, or  due to costs  of 
contracting,  the country is precluded  from ever  holding foreign 
assets  which are indexed to the  shock.  It is doubtful that  this 
story can be used to explain  reputation contracts  of any 
significant  size. 
First,  it is hard to see  what kind of shock  would be 
observable to a huge pool of potential (competitive)  lenders,  but 
yet cannot be put into contracts.  (The concept of observable but 
not verifiable shocks  works  better in the  context  of a bilateral 
16  Grossman and Van Huyck (1987)  take  this  tack. 15 
monopoly relationship.)  Second,  much of the uncertainty  that  a 
small country  faces  ia likely  to be highly correlated with events 
elsewhere  in the world.  Commodity  price  uncertainty,  for 
example,  can clearly be hedged in world asset  markets.  So,  too, 
can  shocka  to world  demand for  the country's  other  goods; 
certainly  technology  shocks are highly correlated  with events 
elsewhere  in the world.  Even weather conditions  can be highly 
correlated  across  countries.  As long  as the country is able  to 
lend  in world capital  markets  after a default,  it ought to be 
able  to construct  a portfolio  which is highly correlated  with . 
FinalLy,  to the extent that  foreign  loans  are  used  simply to 
smooth predictable  seasonal fluctuations  in income,  verification 
is not  an issue.  (Our theorem encompasses  this  case.) 
0.  Difficulties  in Observing the Countty's  Actions 
Theorem l does not  apply  directly to the  case  where  the 
country has  private  information,  though  an extension might  be 
possible.17  Suppose,  for example,  that  investors  observe output, 
y(8, I), but they do not directly obsee investment,  I, or the 
shock,  .  In  this case, it is still possible  to characterize  any 
reputational  equilibrium  as an implicit  contract, except  that  the 
country's  payments,  P0, will  only be a function  of y0 
tl' y02, 
.  .).  As  before,  the  country always  has  the 
option of switching  over  to cashin-advance  contracts,  which can 
17  Kletzer (1984)  considers  some  implications  of private 
information  for  LOG Loan contracts.  For  a more  recent example, 
see Atkeson (1987). 16 
also  be  indexed  to  However,  the  terms  of the post- 
repudistion cash-in-advance  contracts  will depend  on investors' 
beliefs about I  ,  I  ,  etc.  If  a default at time  a adversely  a  s-I 
affects investors'  beliefs about the country's capital  stock, 
this will hurt its ability to get  good  terms  on its  cash-in- 
advance contracts (since  investors  will attach a higher 
probability to low  realizations  of y).  Of course,  the country 
may still  be better off  than under the reputation contract, 
especially when D  kW. 
The difficulty  here  is  that  sequential  equilibrium  places  no 
18 
restrictions  on investors'  off-the-equilibrium  path beliefs. 
The resulting  multiplicity  of sequential equilibria  is endemic in 
models with private information.  It seems  unlikely that  one can 
obtain  a definite result  in the present context without applying 
a refinement of sequential equilibrium,  and without fully 
specifying the country's  utility function and production 
function,  We conjecture that  the intuition  underlying the 
present analysis should carry over  to private information  case, 
but  the question can  only be resolved after  further research. 
One  should  be cautious about  attaching  too  much  weight to 
the  importance  of private information  in the context of LOt loan 
contracts.  For  one  thing,  9  is an  agaresate  shock,  and it  is 
hard to argue  that  aggregate  information  can be private.  We 
suspect that  in the  typical  LOG,  the country's  leaders do not 
know any more  about  8 than do  the country's major  lenders.  Also, 
18  See  Kreps  and Wilson (1982) 17 
as we have  argued  above in section  V.C,  is probably highly 
correlated  with external  variables, and therefore the component 
which  can potentially  be private  information  ia minor. 
F.  The Country's Preferences  are Unobservable 
As long  as the  country's  actions are  observable,  and  as long 
as investors  believe that  the country prefers having  more  to 
having less,  tnen  it does  not matter whether investors  know  the 
country's  preferences  exactly.  Theoreir I would still  apply, 
F.  Restrictions  on the Use  of Foreign-Currency  Reserves 
Some  authors  have  tried  to provide  a  role  for reputation  by 
assuming that a country  cannot use  its foreign-currency  reserves 
to buy irports  needed for investment.  They assume  that  foreign 
investment goods  can  only  b  urchased with new  loans.19  Thus  a 
country can  gain  by repaying  a lender  P dollars  from  its foreign 
currency reserves in exchange  for  P  r  dollars worth of  new 
loans. 
We do not  think  such  loans  should  be classified as 
"reputational",  since  the lender  is assumed able  to directly 
interfere  with the  country's  trade.  In any  event,  it is hard to 
justify the assumption that a country  cannot buy  the same  goods 
with  its own  foreign-currency  earnings that  it can buy with 
lenders'  foreign  currency.  We believe that  the conventional 
assumption,  that what  a country  can  buy depends only  on how much 
money it has available to spend,  is the correct one. 
19 
See,  for  example,  Eaton  and Gersovitz (1983), Cole and 
English (1987),  or Grossman and Van Huyck (1987). 18 
VI.  OTHER DEFICIENCIES IN REPUTATION-FOR-REPAYMENT  MODELS 
There  are  a number of empirical  and theoretical  problems 
with  reputstion-for-repayment  models  beyond those  problems raised 
thus  fsr.  We have not  even  mentioned  the coordination  problem 
inherent in a reputation  model with  a huge number of potential 
lenders.  How  long  will  a country  which  defaults be shut  out  of 
credit markets?  The  greater  the length  of the "punishment 
period",  the more a country can be lent.  But each creditor must 
know how  long  other  creditors  will  wait  before resuming lending. 
Of course,  the coordination  problem is mitigated if the  legal 
system gives  existing creditors  equal  seniority  with any  new 
lenders,  as in real-world  debt  contracts.  But then LDC debt 
contracts  should  be  analyzed as a bsrgeining  problem, not as  a 
reputation-for-repayment  problem. 
Eichengreen  (1987),  and  Lindert  and Morton (1987)  have  shown 
that, historically,  the  ability  of LDC's  to participate in credit 
markets does  not  seem  to depend  on their past repayment records 
It does  depend on their volume of trade and their  ONP. 
Furthermore,  as Wynne (1951)  and Winkler (1933)  document  it is 
typically  necessary for  a country to settle  (reschedule)  its  past 
defaults  before it is allowed access  to new loans. 
Finally,  a legal/bargaining  approach predicts that  the 
countries  of jurisdiction for international  loans  will  be major 
creditor countries.  Reputation-for-repayment  models make  the 
faisifiable  prediction that  lenders  should  be equally willing to 
have  contracts  adjudicated  in debtor-country  courts. 19 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
In reputational  models of LDC borrowing, a country is 
willing to make  transfers  to foreign  lenders  in order  to preserve 
its reputation  for repaying debts.  We have  shown,  under rather 
general  conditions,  that  "reputation"  (for repayment) contracts 
cannot  be equilibrium  unless  the country is prohibited froa 
holding assets  abroad.  But  this  prohibition  seems  to contradict 
the central premise  of reputation-for-repayment  models --  thsc 
the  only  sanction creditors  can  impose  in the event of  a default 
is a refusal to extend  new  loans.  True,  the  set  of assets 
available to the country in the world's  vast and varied capital 
markets may  not  quite  span the  set  of shocks  to which  an implicit 
reputation contract can be  indexed.  But  as long  as it comes 
close,  the maximum size  of reputation  contracts is quite  limited. 
We believe that  Western loans  to small  developing countries 
in fact  depend on the  legal  snd political rights  of lenders 
within their  own countries,20  The  reason  that  an LOC  cannot 
simply  default  on its  loans  and  switch  to cash-in-advance  capital 
market transactions  is that existing creditors  can seize  its 
assets  abroad.2'  Admittedly,  there  are many  uncertainties 
20  .  .  -  -  For  a detailed discussion,  see Bulow and Rogoff (1987), 
or Alexander (1987).  Lenders  are  able  to hinder a defaulter's 
goods  market transactions  as well  as its  capital  market 
transactions.  As we argue  in our earlier paper,  the  main  cost  of 
repudiation  may well be  in lost  gains  from  trade. 
21 
Eaton,  Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986)  argue  that 
insurance  and consumption smoothing  can  only  provide a motive for 
debt  repayments in an  infinite-horizon  context.  Their discussion 
is based on  a reputational  contract.  In a contract  backed up by 
legal  rights,  there is no need for  the country's (leader's) 20 
surrounding  the  actual  dsmage which a lender can inflict on an 
LOC;  it is  a gray  area of Western law. But if one  wants  to 
understand LDC  loan  contracts,  then  chese  costs aust be acudied 
further.  Reputation for repayment  considerations  are  at most a 
secondary  factor. 
If countries  who default auffer  reduced access to world 
capital  markets,  does  it really  matter whether reputational  or 
legal  sanctions  are  the cause?  Yea,  It certainly matters  from 
an empirical perspective.  If the cutoff is based on lenders' 
legal  rights,  then LDCa  can bargain  with their  lenders,  as  in 
Bulow and Rogoff <198?)  .  A  borrower cannot bargain over trigger- 
atrategy beliefa.  Because reputation-for-repayment  modela 
neglect a county's ability to bargain,  they greatly overstate  the 
ability of lenders  to threaten  to cut off an LOC from world 
capital  marketa,  Thus they  tend  to overatate the empirical 
importance  of capital  market cutoffa  relative  to say, 
interference  with the  country'a  current account transactions. 
The distinction  between bargaining  modela and reputation 
modela  is also  important  for policy.  A Weatern government policy 
to force  LDC  loans  through  equity marketa may  be insensitive  to 
the legal  reaaona why  LDC  loana have historically  been channelled 
through  bank markets and bond marketa.22  Alao,  some  have  argued 
that debt forgiveneas  achemes may actually  harm LDCa  by causing 
horizon to be infinite. 
22  -  -  For  a discussion  of "debt-equity"  awapa,  aee Helpman 
(1987). 21 
theni  to forfeit their reputation for repayment.  We would argue 
that if,  through bargaining, an LDC can induce its lenders  to 
forgive a portion of its debts, it will gain.  Debts which are 
forgiven will be  forgotten. 22 
APPENDIX: PROOF OF THEOREM 2 
Define 
k=t mk/(l 
+ r)t,  f I) 
Since D  can never exceed W, then there must exist  acme  q' 
O ￿  q' ￿  1,  such that with  probability  one, 
—  ￿  q'(W 
,  V  6, 1t-l' Vt,  (A.2) 
Let  q be the minimum q'  such thst condition (A.2) holds. 
— ll can  be thought  of as the  amount  of debt not auppottable 
by direct sanctions,  i.e.,  reputation debt. 
£roof of Theor:  Suppose  0  — 11  ￿  q[W  — II  — (y  — 
Then  the country  can  cease  payment on its reputation  contract and 
initiate the following  sequence  of cssh-in-advanoe  contracts: 
For  all  t ￿  s  invest A  in return  for  a payment of  0 
where: 
A  P  —r +qIW  —II  —(y  —rfl—(O  —ii),  {A.3) 
s  5  5  's  a  s  a  a  5 
t  —  s'  Vt>s,  (A4) 
q(W0 —113 
—  —  Vt>s.  (AS) 
Since  O,  —  q(W  —  inspection  of (A.5)  indicates 
that  condition (7)  is satisfied. 
We note that 
ES(Wt±S 
— 11t+l  (1 + r){W,  — fl 
—  —  'ç)],  (A6) 23 
and that 
E(D,  —  —  (1  + r)[D 
— II 
— (F, 
—  (A7) 
Straightforward aubstitution of  (A.6)  and  (A7)  into  (A.3), 
(A4) and (A.5)  confirms that  (6)  holds.  Thus,  the sequence of 
cash-in-advance contracts is feasible,  Furthermore, inatead of 
paying P  in each period,  the country need only pay A  ￿  P  — it 
in  period  and  (y 
—  —  s  for  t > a, with 
equality holding only when q — 0.  Thua q — 0  and,  by  (A.2), 
Dt ￿fl  QE.D. 24 
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